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of statement and in accuracy of reasoning. One great virtue, however, must be conceded to it ; it is not stereotyped, and even in its faults, which are great, it avoids the academic commonplaces.

The problem proposed is the investigation and evaluation of doubt, which is justly recognized as an important factor in the intellectual life of the present, and, indeed, of all times. As stated in the preface, the thesis of the book is that doubt is essential to real belief ; but in the following chapters the course of the argument tends to identify the two, and thus to make it possible to apply to doubt whatever assertions can be shown to hold of belief. Moreover, one has constantly to reckon with the assumptions that whatever is possible is real, and that every idea vouches for the existence of a corresponding reality, the nature of which is left in obscurity, but which is described as other than the conscious processes involved, and also as constituting the object of every doubter's implicit creed. The largest portion of the book is given up to an examination, first of the ordinary, then of the scientific views, and the usual confusions and contradictions inherent in experience are set forth. Especial emphasis is laid upon the paradoxes of science, which are to be regarded as a justification of the doubter's position, since they lead beyond the limitations which science would otherwise be unable to recognize, much less overcome. The same mode of treatment is applied to the contradictions between the individual and the social sides of human personality, and here too "doubt is found to make for belief." There follows a glorification of Descartes as a typical doubter, and the book ends with an account of the Doubter's World, in which contradiction is identified with the principle of activity and therefore made essential to all genuine knowledge and experience. The Hegelianism of the final chapters is extremely superficial in character, popular in the bad sense of the term, and filled with a sort of moral and religious unction, the nature of which may be gathered from a passage on page 205, in which the doctrine of continuous creation is said to represent God as "always up to date" in his relations with the world.

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Der Intellektualismus in der Griechischen Ethik. Von MAX WUNDT.
Leipzig, Wilhelm Engelmann, 1907. — pp. vi, 104.

This treatise is, as the author informs us, a preliminary study to a larger work on Greek ethics, which will aim to examine the relations of scientific ethics to the general ethical thought of the Greeks. Such an undertaking will make necessary a thorough treatment of the Pre-Socratic period, in which the most important ethical movements to be found in the later systems had already been developed or at least foreshadowed. Dr. Wundt's thesis is that Greek ethics is, in spite of occasional limitations, wholly intellectualistic, that the intellectualistic conception is deeply rooted in the moral consciousness of the Greeks. The Socratic principle that

virtue is knowledge is merely a pregnant expression of the point of view which is common to all their thinkers. For Plato wisdom is the supreme virtue ; even for Aristotle the dianoetical virtues are superior to the practical, and right reason ought to regulate conduct ; according to Epicurus knowledge teaches us how to realize the highest Good by the proper choice of pleasures and pains ; and also with the Stoics knowledge is indispensable to virtue, if not identical with it. We find the same intellectualistic tendencies in the precursors of Socrates, in the Sophists, in Democritus, in Heraclitus, yes, even in the Homeric poems.

This intellectualism seems strange to us to-day ; we are convinced that a man may know the right and yet follow his evil instincts, and that the simple-minded may instinctively hit upon the Good. We can understand this surprising bias of the Greeks when we trace their ethical intellectualism to its origins. We shall find that it has grown out of three entirely distinct tendencies of thought, which, however, are related to each other and have influenced each other in many ways : they are described as Homeric intellectualism, mystical intellectualism, and practical intellectualism.

Dr. Wundt shows how in the Homeric epics the man of prudence, calm deliberation, and wide experience comes to be set against the man of impulse and passion, how the former is always pointing out to the latter, whose vision is obscured by his emotions, the effects of his rash acts. Not only does the man of passion harm himself ; led by blind impulse he also violates his duties to the State, his fellows, his family, and the gods, and thus becomes unjust. The unjust comes to be looked upon as a fool, the calm and prudent as just. We discover similar traces of ethical intellectualism in Hesiod, in the elegiac poets, in the tragedies, and in Aristophanes. Like a red thread the old Homeric idea that passion is foolishness, that it leads to injustice, and that injustice and ignorance are therefore the same, runs through the Greek tragedies. We note, however, in the course of development a change of emphasis. In Homer the prudent and just man is the antithesis of the passionate man ; later on, in Democritus, the unjust man is conceived as the antithesis of the wise and prudent man : injustice is error. We get here a completion of the psychologically false intellectualism : emotions are transformed into more or less unconscious logical processes. The principle of the Democritean ethics is *λογισμός*, which consists in making a correct choice of pleasures (pp. 1-18).

But the Greek also believes in gods and demons whose will he must do in order to keep them well-disposed. But what is their will ? The seer knows that which is hidden from men, and which, nevertheless, has no inconsiderable influence upon the results of their actions. Here, again, knowledge is the source of right action. It is taken for granted that he who knows the rules for human conduct will follow them, since the motives of fear and reverence are regarded as strong enough to compel. This mystical intellectualism, which is found in Homer and Hesiod, receives a new impetus in the religious movement of the sixth century. Through the mys-

teries the participant hopes to escape Hades and to achieve a blessed fate after death. Those who know the secret doctrines will enter upon a happy life (Orphic mysteries and Pythagoreanism). We also find examples of this form of intellectualism in the early philosophers (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles) as well as in the literature of the Greeks (pp. 18-33).

The author shows how these two forms of intellectualism gradually merge into and mutually influence each other in the tragic poets (pp. 33 ff.), and then discusses the third source of intellectualism, which he finds in the peculiar Greek notion of virtue (*ἀρετή*). Virtue is practical efficiency having a purpose, and as such can be taught and acquired. In Homer *ἀρετή* is almost wholly identical with efficiency, efficiency in the sense of outward skill, some dexterity which one has learned and which one understands. This notion of efficiency gradually passes over into our modern notion of virtue, but something of its original meaning perhaps still attaches to the word. The skilful man is one who knows his business; only in case he has learned the rules of his *métier* can he be regarded as efficient. So too the virtuous man must be efficient in something. The goal of this efficiency may be defined differently according to the moral ideals of different periods and movements of thought, but the conception that it is something that one must have learned, something that one must know, was, from the outset, so firmly fixed in the specific Greek notion of virtue that it could not easily be lost (pp. 37-40).

The question now arises, How came these ideals of the man of prudence, the mystical sage, and the skilful artisan, to be so fused that the later thinkers could look upon them as the goal of a unified endeavor? It is the feeling of worth, the esteem, the appreciation, which they all arouse, that finally unites these three groups of human beings with each other: they are the most worthy personalities and hence moral ideals. But from the very beginning the mystical sage occupies the most prominent place. And we find in nearly all the ethical systems that wisdom, which in time changes from mystical wisdom to scientific wisdom, takes the highest place. It is almost always assumed that he who possesses the greatest wisdom will best meet the demands of rational prudence and practical efficiency (pp. 40-42).

The second chapter gives a survey of the development of intellectualism in Greek ethics, taking up the Sophists and Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and Neo-Platonism. Dr. Wundt points out that the general character of the different ethical systems is determined by the different emphasis which is placed upon the three forms of intellectualism which have been mentioned, and by the various ways in which they influence each other. Practical intellectualism wholly controls the thinking of the Sophists and of Socrates in the beginnings of scientific ethics, but plays no great rôle afterward. The entire development of intellectualism is for the most part marked by the reciprocal influence of the mystical and Homeric forms. Plato transforms the practical notion of virtue into the scientific notion, and this he connects directly with the mystical point of

view by means of the ingenious conception of reminiscence. Scientific investigation becomes the bridge between mystical knowledge and prudence. In Aristotle, Homeric intellectualism prevails almost exclusively; theoretical wisdom, which is here identical with scientific knowledge, forming a separate element. This is still truer of the system of Epicurus, but in his portrayal of the wise man we discern faint traces of the mystical sage. These features are more and more emphasized from this time on; Homeric intellectualism becomes more and more completely absorbed into mystical intellectualism, the climax being reached in Neo-Platonism.

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Das Gesetz der Vernunft und die ethischen Strömungen der Gegenwart.

Von ERNST MARCUS. Herford, Menckhoff, 1907. — pp. iv, 284.

The object of this book is to show that the Kantian system of ethics is a pure science, that the moral laws and even the supreme legal principles can be deduced and established logically, with mathematical precision. We need no longer search for the science of ethics, the author declares; it is complete, though only in its principles. "All that is required is to show that Kant has enabled us to deduce ethical propositions and to discover moral errors 'with geometric accuracy,' that we are able to give exact ethical proofs" (p. 6).

The notion of law, which is the product of the intellect or of pure reason, is the basal concept of ethics. The important criterion of morality which Kant has discovered is: Thou shalt act according to a law which is logically suited to rational beings. To this law must be applied the universal and necessary characteristics of the concept of law, which are described as follows: (1) The law holds exclusively for the subjects to whom the law is addressed; (2) it holds absolutely, without exception, for all subjects of the law; (3) the third characteristic is the principle of the conservation of the substance of these subjects of the law (pp. 35 ff.). From the notion of the law and these fundamental characteristics of law all moral laws can be logically deduced, *e. g.*, the injunction against murder and suicide, the law of neutrality (impartiality) of the law, the basal law of morals (veracity), the command against injury, and the law of furtherance, etc.

We also have a second criterion of morality, the absence of which would not contradict the notion of law as such, but would contradict a law adapted to intelligent beings. For the law for intelligent beings must do justice to their necessary intellectual character, that is, it must recognize and demand their character as a unified teleological centre, since it has to regulate the matter of their purposes. Indeed, it presupposes this unity of person since its command of persistent obedience is addressed to this very unity. The consciousness of this unity (self-consciousness) reaches its full fruition only as there arises the consciousness of responsibility before the law, the consciousness of the unified causality of all acts, *i. e.*, the consciousness of free-